An Examination of African Conceptions of Personhood and Their Implications for Artificial Persons

This essay, titled “An Examination of African Conceptions of Personhood and their Implications for Artificial Persons,” exposes diverse African conceptions of personhood, critically evaluates prominent scholars' perspectives on philosophical debates surrounding the concept of personhood and highlights key challenges and objections to traditional notions of personhood. Furthermore, extending this inquiry to artificial persons, this study investigates the implications of these complex conceptions for artificial persons, questioning whether non-human entities (artificial persons) can be considered persons despite lacking moral agency. The essay notes that the non-inclusivity of artificial persons within the matrix of personhood in African philosophy creates a problem of disconnect between people and the artificial persons they interact with, which negatively affects their experience and their ability to benefit from these technologies. Analyzing the nature and the implications of this disconnect, the essay raises fundamental questions such as: “What constitutes personhood?” “Can artificial persons possess personhood?” and “What are the ethical and philosophical implications of such considerations?” By addressing these questions, this essay provides clarity on personhood's nature, artificial persons' potential and related ethical considerations crucial to on-going debates on personhood and artificial entities discourse within African philosophy at large. The philosophical methods of analysis and criticisms are deployed in this essay to clearly conceptualize issues and address concerns raised.