Test for Information Asymmetry Problems in Nigeria National Health Insurance Scheme

Student: Amarachi Grace Augustine (Project, 2025)
Department of Insurance and Actuarial Science
University of Benin, Benin City, Edo State

Abstract

This study tests for information asymmetry problems in Nigeria national health insurance scheme (NHIS). The study focused on two states in Nigeria. To this end we distributed well-designed and structured questionnaires to participants in the scheme in Ogun and Edo state. Test statistics technique was adopted and it was discovered that there is significant proof of the existence of moral hazard in Nigeria’s NHIS and that adverse selection also significantly plagues the NHIS in Nigeria. We recommend that for Nigeria’s NHIS to be able to effectively and efficiently carry out its main purpose of health care affordability and accessibility; to citizens of the country, there is need for efficient flow of information between the participants in the scheme and the regulators of the scheme. Absence of the flow of correct and detailed information between the scheme participants and the managers or regulators of the scheme will defeat the purpose of establishing the scheme.

Keywords
National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) Information Asymmetry Moral Hazard Adverse Selection Nigeria
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